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Abstract
Decentralised optimisation tasks are important components of multi-
agent systems. These tasks can be interpreted as n-player potential games:
therefore game-theoretic learning algorithms can be used to solve decen-
tralised optimisation tasks. Fictitious play is the canonical example of
these algorithms. Nevertheless fictitious play implicitly assumes that play-
ers have stationary strategies. We present a novel variant of fictitious play
where players predict their opponents’ strategies using Extended Kalman
filters and use their predictions to update their strategies.
We show that in 2 by 2 games with at least one pure Nash equilibrium
and in potential games where players have two available actions, the pro-
posed algorithm converges to the pure Nash equilibrium. The performance
of the proposed algorithm was empirically tested, in two strategic form
games and an ad-hoc sensor network surveillance problem. The proposed
algorithm performs better than the classic fictitious play algorithm in
these games and therefore improves the performance of game-theoretical
learning in decentralised optimisation.
Keywords: Multi-agent learning, game theory, fictitious play, decen-
tralised optimisation, learning in games, Extended Kalman filter.
1 Introduction
Recent advance in technology render decentralised optimisation a crucial com-
ponent of many applications of multi agent systems and decentralised control.
Sensor networks (Kho et al., 2009), traffic control (van Leeuwen et al., 2002)
and scheduling problems (Stranjak et al., 2008) are some of the tasks where
decentralised optimisation can be used. These tasks share common character-
istics such as large scale, high computational complexity and communication
constraints that make a centralised solution intractable. It is well known that
many decentralised optimisation tasks can be cast as potential games (Wolpert
and Turner, 1999.; Arslan et al., 2006), and the search of an optimal solution
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can be seen as the task of finding Nash equilibria in a game. Thus it is feasi-
ble to use iterative learning algorithms from game-theoretic literature to solve
decentralised optimisation problems.
A game theoretic learning algorithm with proof of convergence in certain
kinds of games is fictitious play (Fudenberg and Levine, 1998; Monderer and
Shapley, 1996). It is a learning process where players choose an action that
maximises their expected rewards according to the beliefs they maintain about
their opponents’ strategies.The players update their beliefs about their oppo-
nents’ strategies after observing their actions. Even though fictitious play con-
verges to Nash equilibrium, this convergence can be very slow. This is because
it implicitly assumes that other players use a fixed strategy in the whole game.
Smyrnakis and Leslie (2010) addressed this problem by representing the ficti-
tious play process as a state space model and by using particle filters to predict
opponents’ strategies. The drawback of this approach is the computational cost
of the particle filters that render difficult the application of this method in real
time applications.
The alternative that we propose in this article is to use instead of particle
filters, extended Kalman filters (EKF) to predict opponents’ strategies. There-
fore the proposed algorithm has smaller computational cost than the particle
filter variant of fictitious play algorithm that proposed by Smyrnakis and Leslie
(2010). We show that the EKF fictitious play algorithm converges to a pure
Nash equilibrium, in 2 by 2 games with at least one pure Nash equilibrium and
in potential games where players have two available actions. We also empirically
observe, in a range of games, that the proposed algorithm needs less iterations
than the classic fictitious play to converge to a solution. Moreover in our simu-
lations, the proposed algorithm converged to a solution with higher reward than
the classic fictitious play algorithm.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. We start with a brief
description of game theory, fictitious play and extended Kalman filters. Section
3 introduces the proposed algorithm that combines fictitious play and extended
Kalman filters. The convergence results we obtained are presented in Section
4. In Section 5 we propose some indicative values for the EKF algorithm pa-
rameters. Section 6 presents the simulation results of EKF fictitious play in a
2×2 coordination game, a three player climbing hill game and an ad-hoc sensor
network surveillance problem. In the final section we present our conclusions.
2 Background
In this section we introduce some definition from game theory that we will
use in the rest of this article and the relation between potential games and
decentralised optimisation. We also briefly present the classic fictitious play
algorithm and the extended Kalman filter algorithm.
2.1 Game theory definitions
We consider a game Γ with I players, where each player i,i = 1, 2, . . . , I, choose
his action, si, from a finite discrete set Si. We then can define the joint action
that is played in a game as the set product S = ×i=Ii=1Si. Each Player i receive a
reward, ui, after choosing an action . The reward is a map from the joint action
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space to the real numbers, ui : S → R. We will often write s = (si, s−i), where
si is the action of Player i and s−i is the joint action of Player i’s opponents.
When players select their actions using a probability distribution they use mixed
strategies. The mixed strategy of a player i, σi, is an element of the set ∆i,
where ∆i is the set of all the probability distributions over the action space Si.
The joint mixed strategy, σ, is then an element of ∆ = ×i=Ii=1∆i. Analogously
to the joint actions we will write σ = (σi, σ−i). In the special case where the
players choose an action with probabiity one we will say that players choose
their actions using pure strategies. The expected utility a player i will gain if
he chooses a strategy σi (resp. si), when his opponents choose the joint strategy
σ−i is ui(σi, σ−i) (resp. ui(si, σ−i)).
A common decision rule in game theory is best response (BR). The best
response is defined as the action that maximizes players’ expected utility given
their opponents’ strategies. Thus for a specific opponents’ strategy σ−i we
evaluate the best response as:
BRi(σ−i) = argmax
si∈S
ui(si, σ−i) (1)
Nash (1950) showed that every game has at least one equilibrium, which is
a fixed point of the best response correspondence, σi ∈ BR(σ−i). Thus when a
joint mixed strategy σˆ is a Nash equilibrium then:
ui(σˆi, σˆ−i) ≥ ui(si, σˆ−i) for all si ∈ Si (2)
Equation 2 implies that if a strategy σˆ is a Nash equilibrium then it is not
possible for a player to increase his utility by unilaterally changing his strategy.
When all the players in a game select their actions using pure strategies then
the equilibrium actions are referred as pure strategy Nash equilibria. A pure
equilibrium is strict if each player has a unique best response to his opponents
actions.
2.2 Decentralised optimisation tasks as potential games
A class of games that are of particular interest in multi agent systems and
decentralised optimisation tasks are potential games, because of their utility
structure. In particular in order to be able to solve an optimisation task de-
centrally the local functions should have similar characteristics with the global
function that we want to optimise. This suggests that an action which improves
or reduces the utility of an individual should respectively increase or reduce
the global utility. Potential games have this property, since the potential func-
tion (global function) depict the changes in the players’ payoffs (local functions)
when they unilaterally change their actions. More formally we can write
ui(si, s−i)− ui(s˜i, s−i) = φ(si, s−i)− φ(s˜i, s−i)
where φ is a potential function and the above equality stands for every player
i, for every action s−i ∈ S−i, and for every pair of actions si, s˜i ∈ Si, where Si
and S−i represent the set of all available actions for Player i and his opponents
respectively. Moreover potential games has at least one pure Nash equilibrium,
hence there is at least one joint action s where no player can increase their
reward, therefore the potential function, through a unilateral deviation.
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It is feasible to choose an appropriate form of the agents’ utility function
in order for the global utility to act as a potential of the system. Wonderful
life utility is a utility function that introduced by Wolpert and Turner (1999.)
and applied by Arslan et al. (2006) to formulate distributed optimisation tasks
as potential games. Player i’s utility, when wonderful life utility is used, can
be defined as the difference between the global utility ug and the utility of the
system when a reference action is used as player’s i action. More formally when
player i chooses an action si we write
ui(si) = ug(s
i, s−i)− ug(si0, s−i)
where si0 denotes the reference action of player i. Hence the decentralised op-
timisation problem can be cast as a potential game and any algorithm that is
proved to converge to a Nash equilibrium of a potential game, which is a local
or the global optimum of the optimisation problem, will converge to a joint
action from which no player can increase the global reward through unilateral
deviation.
2.3 Fictitious play
Fictitious play (Brown, 1951), is a widely used learning technique in game the-
ory. In fictitious play each player chooses his action according to the best
response to his beliefs about his opponents’ joint mixed strategy σ−i.
Initially each player has some prior beliefs about the strategy that each of
his opponents uses to choose an action based on a weight function κt. The play-
ers, after each iteration, update the weight function and therefore their beliefs
about their opponents’ strategies and play again the best response according
to their beliefs. More formally in the beginning of a game Player i maintains
some arbitrary non-negative initial weight functions κj0, ∀j ∈ [1, I]\{i}, that are
updated using the formula:
κjt (s
j) = κjt−1(s
j) + Isjt=sj
for each j, where Isjt=sj
=
{
1 if sjt = s
j
0 otherwise.
.
The mixed strategy of opponent j is estimated from the following formula:
σjt (s
j) =
κjt (s
j)∑
s′∈Sj κ
j
t (s
′)
. (3)
Player i based on his beliefs about his opponents’ strategies, chooses the
action which maximises his expected payoffs. When player i uses equation (3)
to update the beliefs about his opponents’ strategies he treats the environment of
the game as stationary and implicitly assumes that the actions of the players are
sampled from a fixed probability distribution. Therefore the recent observations
have the same weight as the initial ones. This approach leads to poor adaptation
when the other players choose to change their strategies.
2.4 Fictitious play as a state space model
We follow Smyrnakis and Leslie (2010) and we will represent fictitious play
process as a state-space model. According to this state space model each player
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has a propensity Qit(s
i) to play each of his available actions si ∈ Si, and then
he forms his strategy based on these propensities. Finally he chooses his actions
based on his strategy and the best response decision rule. Because players have
no information about the evolution of their opponents’ propensities, and under
the assumption that the changes in propensities are small from one iteration
of the game to another, we model propensities using a Gaussian autoregressive
prior on all propensities. We set Q0 ∼ N(0, I) and recursively update the value
of Qt according to the value of Qt−1 as follows:
Q(st) = Q(st−1) + ηt
where ηt ∼ N(0, χ2I). The action of a player then is related to his propensity
by the following sigmoid equation for every si ∈ Si
si =
e(Q
i(si)/τ)∑
s˜∈Si e(Qt(s˜)/τ)
.
Therefore players will assume that at every iteration t their opponents have a
different strategy σt.
2.5 Kalman filters and Extended Kalman filters
Our objective is to estimate player i’s opponent propensity and thus to estimate
the marginal probability p(Qt, s1:t). This objective can be represented as a
Hidden Markov Model (HMM). HMMs are used to predict the value of an
unobserved variable xt, the hidden state, using the observations of another
variable z1:t. There are two main assumptions in the HMM representation. The
former one is that the probability of being at any state xt at time t depends
only at the state of time t − 1, xt−1. The latter one is that an observation
at time t depends only on the current state xt. One of the most common
methods to estimate p(x1:t, z1:t) is Kalman filters and its variations. Kalman
filter (Kalman et al., 1960) is based on two assumptions, the first is that the
state variable is Gaussian. The second is that the observations are the result of
a linear combination of the state variable. Hence Kalman filters can be used in
cases which are represented as the following state space model:
xt =Axt−1 + ξt−1 hidden layer
yt =Bxt + ζt observations
where ξt and ζt follow a zero mean normal distribution with covariance matrices
Ξ = qtI and Z = rtI respectively, and A, B are linear transformation matrices.
When the distribution of the state variable xt is Gaussian then p(xt|y1:t) is also
a Gaussian distribution, since yt is a linear combination of xt. Therefore it is
enough to estimate its mean and variance to fully characterise p(xt|y1:t).
Nevertheless in the state space model we want to implement, the relation
between Player i’s opponent propensity and his actions is not linear. Thus we
should use a more general form of state space model such as:
xt = f(xt−1) + ξt
yt = h(xt) + ζt (4)
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where ξt and ζt are the hidden and observation state noise respectively, with
zero mean and covariance matrices Ξ = qtI and Z = rtI respectively. The
distribution of p(xt|y1:t) is not a Gaussian distribution because f(·) and h(·)
are non-linear functions. A simple method to overcome this shortcoming is to
use a first order Taylor expansion to approximate the distributions of the sate
space model in (4). In particular we let xt = mt−1 + , where mt denotes the
mean of xt and  ∼ N(0, P ). We can rewrite (4) as:
xt = f(mt−1 + ) + wt−1 = f(mt−1) + Fx(mt−1)+ ξt−1
yt = h(mt + ) + ζt = h(mt) +Hx(mt)+ ζt (5)
where Fx(mt−1) and Hx(mt) is the Jacobian matrix of f and h evaluated at
mt−1 and mt, respectively. If we use the transformations in (5) then p(xt|y1:t)
is a Gaussian distribution.
Since p(xt|y1:t) is a Gaussian distribution to fully characterise it we need to
evaluate its mean and its variance. The EKF process (Jazwinski, 1970; Grewal
and Andrews, 2011) estimates this mean and variance in two steps the prediction
and the update step. In the prediction step at any iteration t the distribution
of the state variable is estimated based on all the observations until time t− 1,
p(xt|y1:t−1). The distribution of p(xt|y1:t−1) is Gaussian and we will denote its
mean and variance as m−t and P
−
t respectively. During the update step the
estimation of the prediction step is corrected in the light of the new observation
at time t, so we estimate p(xt|y1:t). This is also a Gaussian distribution and we
will denote its mean and variance as mt and Pt respectively.
The prediction and the update steps of the EKF process (Jazwinski, 1970;
Grewal and Andrews, 2011) to estimate the mean and the variance of p(xt|y1:t−1)
and p(xt|y1:t) respectively are the following:
Prediction Step
m−t =f(mt−1)
P−t =F (mt−1)Pt−1F (mt−1) + Ξt−1
where the j, j′ element of F (mt) is defined as
[F (m−t )]j,j′ =
∂f(xj , r)
∂xj′
|x=m−t ,q=0
Update Step
vt = zt − h(m−t )
St = H(m
−
t )P
−
t H
T (m−t ) + Z
Kt = P
−
t H
T (m−t )S
−1
t
mt = m
−
t +Ktvt
Pt = P
−
t −KtStKTt
where zt is the observation vector (with 1 in the entry of the observed action
and 0 everywhere else) and the j, j′ element of H(mt) is defined as:
[H(m−t )]j,j′ =
∂h(xj , r)
∂xj′
|x=m−t ,r=0
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3 Fictitious play and EKF
For the rest of this paper we will only consider inference over a single opponent
mixed strategy in fictitious play. Separate estimates will be formed identically
and independently for each opponent. We therefore consider only one opponent,
and we drop all dependence on player i, and write st, σt and Qt for Player i’s
opponent’s action, strategy and propensity respectively. Moreover for any vector
x, x[j] will denote the jth element of the vector and for any matrix y, y[i, j] will
denote the (i, j)th element of the matrix.
We can use the following state space model to describe the fictitious play
process:
Qt = Qt−1 + ξt−1
st = h(Qt) + ζt
where ξt−1 ∼ N(0,Ξ), is the noise of the state process and ζt is is the error of
the observation state with zero mean and covariance matrix Z, which occurs
because we approximate a discrete process like best responses, equation (1),
using a continuous function h(·). Hence we can combine the EKF with fictitious
play as follows. At time t − 1 Player i has an estimation of his opponent’s
propensity using a Gaussian distribution with mean mt−1 and variance Pt−1,
and has observed an action st−1. Then at time t he uses EKF prediction step
to estimate his opponent’s propensity. The mean and variance of p(Qt|s1:t−1)
of the opponent’s propensity approximation are:
m−t = mt−1
P−t = Pt−1 + Ξ
Player i then evaluates his opponents strategies using his estimations as:
σt(st) =
exp(m−t [st]/τ)∑
s˜∈S exp(m
−
t [s˜]/τ)
. (6)
where m−t [st] is the mean of Player i’s estimation about the propensity of his
opponent to play action st. Player i then uses the estimation of his opponent
strategy , equation (6), and best responses, equation (1), to choose an action.
After observing the opponent’s action st, Player i correct his estimations about
his opponent’s propensity using the update equations of EKF process. The
update equations are:
vt = zt − h(m−t )
St = H(m
−
t )P
−
t H
T (m−t ) + Z
Kt = P
−
t H
T (m−t )S
−1
t
mt = m
−
t +Ktvt
Pt = P
−
t −KtStKTt
where h = exp(Qt[s
′
]/τ)∑
s˜∈S exp(Qt[s˜]/τ)
, and τ is a temperature parameter. The Jacobian
matrix H(m−t ) is defined as
7
[H(m−t )]j,j′ =

∑
j 6=j′ exp(m
−
t [j]) exp(m
−
t [j
′])
(
∑
j exp(m
−
t [j]))
2
if j = j′
− exp(m−t [j]) exp(m−t [j′])
(
∑
j exp(m
−
t [j]))
2
if j 6= j’
.
Table 1 summarises the fictitious play algorithm when EKF is used to predict
opponents strategies.
At time t
1. Player i maintains some estimations about his opponents propensity up
to time t− 1, p(Qt−1|s1 : t− 1). Thus he has an estimation of the mean
mt−1 and the covariance Pt−1 of this distribution.
2. Then Player i is updating his estimations about his opponents propensi-
ties p(Qt|s1 : t− 1) using equations, m−t = mt−1, P−t = Pt−1 +Wt−1.
3. Based on the weights of step 1 each player updates his beliefs about his
opponents strategies using σjt (s
j) =
exp(m−t (j)/τ)∑
j′ exp(m
−
t (j)/τ)
.
4. Choose an action based on the beliefs of step 3 according to best response.
5. Observe opponent’s action st.
6. Update the propensities estimates using mt = m
−
t + Ktvt and
Pt = P
−
t −KtStKTt .
7. set t=t+1
Table 1: EKF Fictitious Play algorithm
4 Theoretical Results
In this section we present the convergence results we obtained for games with at
least one pure Nash equilibrium and players who have 2 available actions, s =
(1, 2). We will denote as −s the action that a player does not choose, for example
if Player i’s opponent chooses action 1, s = 1 and hence −s = 2. Also we will
denote as m[1] and m[2] the estimated means of opponent’s propensity of action
1 and 2 respectively. Similarly P [1, 1] and P [2, 2] will represent the variance of
the propensity’s estimation of action 1 and 2 respectively, and P [1, 2], P [2, 1]
their covariance.
The proposed algorithm has the following two properties:
Proposition 1. If at iteration t of the EKF fictitious play algorithm, action s is
played from Player i’s opponent, then the estimation of his opponent propensity
to play action s increases, mt−1[s] < mt[s]. Also the estimation of his opponent
propensity to play action −s decreases, mt−1[−s] > mt[−s]
Proof. The proof of Proposition 1 is on Appendix A.
8
L R
U 1,1 0,0
D 0,0 1,1
Table 2: Simple coordination game
Proposition 1 implies that players, when they use EKF fictitious play, learn
their opponent’s strategy and eventually they will choose the action that will
maximise their reward base on their estimation. Nevertheless there are cases
where players may change their action simultaneously and trapped in a cycle
instead of converging in a pure Nash equilibrium. As an example we consider
the game that is depicted in Table 2.
This is a simple coordination game with two pure Nash equilibria the joint
actions (U,L) and (D,R). In the case were the two players start from joint action
(U,R) or (D,L) and they always change their action simultaneously then they
will never reach one of the two pure Nash equilibria of the game.
Proposition 2. In a 2 × 2 game where the players use EKF fictitious play
process to choose their actions, and the variance of the observation state is set
to Z = rI+ I, with high probability the two players will not change their action
simultaneously infinitely often. We define  as a random number from normal
distribution with zero mean and arbitrarily small covariance matrix, I is the
identity matrix.
Proof. The proof of Proposition 2 is on Appendix B.
We should mention here that the reason we set Z = rI + I is in order
to break any symmetries that occurred because the initialisation of the EKF
fictitious play algorithm. Based on Proposition 1 and 2 we can infer the following
propositions and theorems.
Proposition 3. (a) In a game where players have two available actions if s is a
Nash equilibrium, and s is played at date t in the process of EKF fictitious play,
s is played at all subsequent dates. That is, strict Nash equilibria are absorbing
for the process of EKF fictitious play. (b) Any pure strategy steady state of EKF
fictitious play must be a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Consider the case where players beliefs σˆt, are such that their optimal
choices correspond to a strict Nash equilibrium sˆ. In EKF fictitious play pro-
cess players’ beliefs are formed identically and independently for each opponent
based on equation (6). By Proposition 1 we know that players’ estimations
about their opponents’ propensities and therefore their strategies, that each
player maintains for the other players, will increase for the actions that are
included in sˆ and will be reduced otherwise. Thus the best response to their
beliefs σˆt+1 will be again sˆ and since sˆ is a Nash equilibrium they will not de-
viate from it. Conversely, if a player remains at a pure strategy profile, then
eventually the assessments will become concentrated at that profile, because of
Proposition 1, hence if the profile is not a Nash equilibrium, one of the players
would eventually want to deviate.
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Proposition 4. Under EKF fictitious play, if the beliefs over each player’s
choices converge, the strategy profile corresponding to the product of these dis-
tributions is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose that the beliefs of the players at time t, σt, converges to some
profile σˆ. If σˆ were not a Nash equilibrium, some player would eventually want
to deviate and the beliefs would also deviate since based on Proposition 1 players
eventually learn their opponents actions.
Theorem 1. The EKF fictitious play process converges to the Nash equilibrium
in 2 × 2 games with at least one pure Nash equilibrium, when the covariance
matrix of the observation space error, Z, is defined as in Proposition 2, Z =
rI + I.
Proof. We can distinct two possible initial states in the game. In the first
players’ initial beliefs of the players actions are such that their initial joint action
s0 is a Nash equilibrium. From Proposition 3 and equation (6) we know that
they will play the joint action which is a Nash equilibrium for all the iterations
of the game.
The second case where the initial beliefs of the players are such that their
initial joint action s0 is not a Nash equilibrium is divided in 2 subcategories.
The first include 2×2 games with only one pure Nash equilibrium. In this case,
one of the two players has a dominant action, thus for all the iterations of the
game he will choose the dominant action. This action maximises his expected
payoff regardless the other player’s strategy and thus he will select this action
in every iteration of the game. Therefore because of Proposition 1 the other
player will learn his opponent’s strategy and players will choose the joint action
which is the pure Nash equilibrium.
The second category includes 2× 2 games with 2 pure Nash equilibria, like
the simple coordination game that is depicted in Table 2. In this case players
initial joint action s0 = (s
1, s2) is not a Nash equilibrium. Then the players
will learn their opponent’s strategy, Proposition 1 and Equation (6), and they
will change their action. We know from Proposition 2 that in a finite time with
high probability the players will not change their actions simultaneously, and
hence they will end up in a joint action that will be one of the two pure Nash
equilibria of the game.
We can extend the results of Theorem 1 in n× 2 games with a better reply
path. A game with a better reply path can be represented as a graph were its
edges are the join actions of the game s and there is a vertex that connects
s with s′ iff only one player i can increasing his payoff by changing his action
(Young, 2005). Potential games have a better reply path.
Theorem 2. The EKF fictitious play process converges to the Nash equilib-
rium in n× 2 games with a better reply path when the covariance matrix of the
observations space error, Z, is Z = r + I.
Proof. Similarly to the 2× 2 games if the initial beliefs of the players are such
that their initial joint action s0 is a Nash equilibrium, from Proposition 3 and
equation (6), we know that they will play the joint action which is a Nash
equilibrium for the rest of the game.
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Moreover in the case of the initial beliefs of the players are such that their
initial joint action s0 is not a Nash equilibrium based on Proposition 1 and
Proposition 2 after a finite number of iterations because the game has a better
reply path the only player that can improve his payoff by changing his actions
will choose a new action which will result in a new joint action s. If this action
is not the a Nash equilibrium then again after finite number of iterations the
player who can improve his payoff will change action and a new joint action s′
will be played. Thus after the search of the vertices of a finite graph, and thus
after a finite number of iterations, players will choose a joint action which is a
Nash equilibrium.
5 Simulations to define algorithm parameters Ξ
and Z.
The covariance matrix of the state space error Ξ = qI and the measurement
error Z = rI are two parameters that we should define in the beginning of the
EKF fictitious play algorithm and they affect its performance. Our aim is to
find values, or range of values, of q and r that can efficiently track opponents’
strategy when it smoothly or abruptly change, instead of choosing q and r
heuristically for each opponent when we use the EKF algorithm. Nevertheless
it is possible that for some games the results of the EKF algorithm will be
improved for other combinations of q and r than the ones that we propose in
this section.
We examine the impact of EKF fictitious play algorithm parameters in its
performance in the following two tracking scenarios. In the first one a single
opponent chooses his actions using a mixed strategy which changes smoothly and
has a sinusoidal form over the iterations of the tracking scenario. In particular
for t = 1, 2, . . . , 100 iterations of the game: σt(1) =
cos 2pitn +1
2 = 1 − σt(2),
where n = 100. In the second toy example Player i’s opponent change his
strategy abruptly and chooses action 1 with probability σ2t (1) = 1 during the
first 25 and the last 25 iterations of the game and for the rest iterations of
the game σ2t (1) = 0. The probability of the second action is calculated as:
σ2t (2) = 1− σ2t (1).
We tested the performance of the proposed algorithm for the following range
of parameters 10−4 ≤ q ≤ 1 and 10−4 ≤ r ≤ 1. We repeated both examples
100 times for each of the combinations of q and r. Each time we measured the
absolute error of the estimated strategy against the real one. The combined
average absolute error when both examples are considered is depicted on Figure
1. The darkest areas of the contour plot represent the areas where the average
absolute error is minimised.
The average absolute error is minimised for a range of values of q and r,
that form two distinct areas. In the first area, the wide dark area of Figure
1, the range of q and r were 0.08 ≤ q ≤ 0.4 and 0.2 ≤ r ≤ 1 respectively. In
the second area, the narrow dark area of Figure 1, the range of q and r were
0.001 ≤ q ≤ 0.025 and 0.08 ≤ r ≤ 0.13 respectively. The minimum error which
we observed in our simulations was in the narrow area and in particular when
Ξ = 0.01I and Z = 0.1I, where I is the identical matrix.
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Figure 1: Combined absolute error for both tracking scenarios. The range of
both parameters, q and r is between 10−4 and 1.
U
M
D
U M D
0 0 0
0 50 40
0 0 30
U
U M D
-300 70 80
-300 60 0
0 0 0
M
U M D
100 -300 90
0 0 0
0 0 0
D
Table 3: Climbing hill game with three players. Player 1 selects rows, Player 2
selects columns, and Player 3 selects the matrix. The global reward depicted in
the matrices, is received by all players. The unique Nash equilibrium is in bold
6 Simulation results
This section is divided in two parts. The first part contains results of our simu-
lations in two strategic form games and the second part contains the results we
obtained in an ad-hoc sensor network surveillance problem. In all the simula-
tions of this section we set the covariance matrix of the hidden and the observa-
tions state to Ξ = 0.01I and Z = (0.1 + )I respectively, where  ∼ N(0, 10−5)
and I is the identical matrix.
6.1 Simulations results in strategic form games
In this section we compare the results of our algorithm with those of fictitious
play in two coordination games. These games are depicted in Tables 2 and 3.
The game that is depicted in Table 2, as it was described in Section 4 , is a simple
coordination game with two pure Nash equilibria, its diagonal elements. Table
3 presents an extreme version of the climbing hill game (Claus and Boutilier,
1998) in which three players must climb up a utility function in order to reach
the Nash equilibrium where their reward is maximised.
We present the results of 50 replications of a learning episode of 50 iterations
for each game. As it is depicted in Figures 2 and 3 the proposed algorithm
performs better than fictitious play in both cases. In the simple coordination
game that is shown in Table 2, the EKF fictitious play algorithm converges to
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Figure 2: Results of EKF and classic fictitious play in the simple coordination
game of Table 2
one of the pure equilibria after a few iterations. On the other hand fictitious
play is trapped in a limit cycle in all the replications where the initial joint
action was not one of the two pure Nash equilibria. For that reason the players’
payoff for all the iterations of the game was either 1 utility unit or 0 utility
units depending to the initial joint action. In the climbing hill game, Table 3
the proposed algorithm converges to the Nash equilibrium after 35 iterations
when fictitious play algorithm do not converge even after 50 iterations.
6.2 Ad-hoc sensor network surveillance problem.
We compared the results of our algorithm against those of fictitious play in a
coordination task of a power constrained sensor network, where sensors can be
either in a sense or sleep mode (Farinelli et al., 2008; Chapman et al., 2011).
When the sensors are in sense mode they can observe the events that occur in
their range. During their sleep mode the sensors harvest the energy they need
in order to be able function when they are in the sense mode. The sensors then
should coordinate and choose their sense/sleep schedule in order to maximise
the coverage of the events. This optimisation task can be cast as a potential
game. In particular we consider the case where I sensors are deployed in an area
where E events occur. If an event e, e ∈ E, is observed from the sensors then it
produce some utility Ve. Each of the sensors i = 1, . . . , I should choose an action
si = j, from one of the j = 1, . . . , J time intervals which they can be in sense
mode. Each sensor i when it is in sense mode can observe an event e, if it is
in its sense range, with probability pie =
1
die
, where die is the distance between
the sensor i and the event e. We assume that the probability each sensor has
to observe an event is independent from the other sensors. If we denote as iin
the sensors that are in sense mode when the event e occurs and e is in their
sensing range, then we can write the probability an event e to be observed from
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Figure 3: Probability of playing the (U,U,D) equilibrium for the EKF fictitious
play (solid line) and fictitious play (dash line) for the three player climbing hill
game
the sensors, iin as
1−
∏
i∈iin
(1− pie)
The expected utility that is produced from the event e is the product of its
utility Ve and the probability it has to be observed by the sensors, iin that are
in sense mode when the event e occurs and e is in their sensing range. More
formally we can express the utility that is produced from an event e as:
Ue(s) = Ve(1−
∏
i∈iin
(1− pie))
The global utility is then the sum of the utilities that all events, e ∈ E, produce
Uglobal(s) =
∑
e
Ue(s).
Each sensor after each iteration of the game receives some utility which is
based on the sensors and the events that are inside his communication and sense
range respectively. For a sensor i we denote e˜ the events that are in its sensing
range and s˜−i the joint action of the sensors that are inside his communication
range. The utility that sensor i will receive if his sense mode is j will be
Ui(s
i = j, s˜−i) =
∑
e˜
Ue˜(s
i = j, s˜−i).
We compared the performance of the two algorithms in 2 instances of the
above scenario one with 20 and one with 50 sensors that are deployed in a unit
square. In both instances sensors had to choose one time interval of the day that
they will be in sense mode and use the rest time intervals to harvest energy. We
consider cases where sensors had to choose their sense mode between 2, 3 and
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4 available time intervals. Sensors are able to communicate with other sensors
that are at most 0.6 distance units away, and can only observe events that are
at most 0.3 distance units away. Moreover in both instances we assumed that
20 events took place in the unite square area. Those events were uniformly
distributed in space and time, so an event could evenly appear in any point of
the unit square area and it could occur at any time with the same probability.
The duration of each event was uniformly chosen between (0-6] hours and each
event had a value Ve ∈ (0 − 1]. Figures 4 and 5 depict the average results
of 50 replications of the game for the two algorithms. For each instance, both
algorithms run for 50 iterations. To be able to average across the 50 replications
we normalise the utility of a replication by the global utility that the sensors
will gain if they were only in sense mode during the whole day.
(a) Results when sensors have to
choose between two time intervals.
(b) Results when sensors have to
choose between three time intervals.
(c) Results when sensors have to
choose between four time intervals.
Figure 4: Results of the instance where 20 sensors should coordinate for both
algorithms. The results of EKF fictitious play are the solid lines and the results
of the classic fictitious play are the dash lines. The horizontal axis of the figures
depict the iteration of the game and the vertical axis the global utility as a
percentage of the global utility of the system in the case that sensors were
always in sense mode.
As we observe in Figures 4 and 5 EKF fictitious play converges to a stable
joint action faster than the fictitious play algorithm. In particular on average
the EKF fictitious play algorithm needed 10 “negotiation” steps between the
sensors in order to reach a stable joint action, when fictitious ply needed more
than 25. Moreover the classic fictitious play algorithm was always resulted in
joint actions with smaller reward than the proposed algorithm.
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(a) Results when sensors have to
choose between two time intervals.
(b) Results when sensors have to
choose between three time intervals.
(c) Results when sensors have to
choose between four time intervals.
Figure 5: Results of the instance where 50 sensors should coordinate for both
algorithms. The results of EKF fictitious play are the solid lines and the results
of the classic fictitious play are the dash lines. The horizontal axis of the figures
depict the iteration of the game and the vertical axis the global utility as a
percentage of the global utility of the system in the case that sensors were
always in sense mode.
7 Conclusion
We have introduced a variation of fictitious play that uses Extended Kalman
filters to predict opponents’ strategies. This variation of fictitious play addresses
the implicit assumption of the classic algorithm that opponents use the same
strategy in every iteration of the game.
We showed that, for 2 × 2 games with at least one pure Nash equilibrium,
EKF fictitious play converges in the pure Nash equilibrium of the game. More
over the proposed algorithm converges in games with a better reply path, like
potential games, and n players that have 2 available actions.
EKF fictitious play performed better than the classic algorithm algorithm
in the strategic form games and the ad-hoc sensor network surveillance problem
we simulated. Our empirical observations indicate that EKF fictitious play con-
verges to a solution that is better than the classic algorithm and needs only a
few iterations to reach that solution. Hence by slightly increasing the computa-
tional intensity of fictitious play less communication is required between agents
to quickly coordinate on a desired solution.
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A Proof of Proposition 1
We will base the proof of Proposition 1 on the properties of EKF when they
used to estimate opponent’s strategy with two available actions. If player i’s
opponent has two available actions 1 and 2, then we can assume that at time
t−1 Player i maintains beliefs about his opponent’s propensity, with mean mt−1
and variance Pt−1. Moreover based on these estimations he chooses his strategy
σt−1. At the prediction step of this process he uses the following equations to
predict his opponent’s propensity and choose an action using best response.
m−t =
(
m−t−1[1]
m−t−1[2]
)
P−t =
(
P−t−1[1, 1] P
−
t−1[1, 2]
P−t−1[2, 1] P
−
t−1[2, 2]
)
+ qI
without loss of generality we can assume that his opponent in iteration t chooses
action 2. Then the update step will be :
vt = zt − h(m−t )
since Players i’s opponent played action 2 and h = exp(Qt[s
′
]/τ)∑
s˜∈S exp(Qt[s˜]/τ)
we can
write vt and Ht(m
−
t ) as:
vt =
(
0
1
)
−
(
σt−1(1)
1− σt−1(1)
)
=
( −σt−1(1)
σt−1(1)
)
Ht(m
−
t ) =
(
at −at
−at at
)
where at is defined at = σt−1(1)σt−1(2). The estimation of St = H(m−t )P
−
t H
T (m−t ) + Z
will be:
St = a
2
(
b −b
−b b
)
+ Z
where b = P−t [1, 1]+P
−
t [2, 2]−2P−t [1, 2]. The Kalaman gain, Kt = P−t HT (m−t )S−1t
can be written as
Kt =
1
2rb+ r2
(
P−t [1, 1] k
k P−t [2, 2]
)(
at −at
−at at
)(
b+ r b
b b+ r
)
up to a multiplicative constant we can write
K1 ∼
(
c −c
−d d
)
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where c = P−t [1, 1]−P−t [1, 2] and d = P−t [2, 2]−P−t [1, 2]. The updates then for
the mean and variance are:
mt =m
−
t +Ktvt
Pt =P
−
t −KtStKTt
The mean of the Gaussian distribution that is used to estimate opponent’s
propensities is:
mt =
(
mt[1]
mt[2]
)
=
(
m−t [1]− 2σ(1) a(b−k)4a2(b−k)+(r+)
m−t [2] + 2σ(1)
a(b−k)
4a2(b−k)+(r+)
)
(7)
Based on the above we observe that mt(1) < mt−1(1) and mt(2) > mt−1(2)
which completes the proof.
B Proof of Proposition 2
We consider 2 × 2 games with at least one pure Nash equilibrium. In the case
that only one Nash equilibrium exists, a dominant strategy exists and thus one
of the players will not deviate from this action. Hence we are interested in
in 2 × 2 games with two pure Nash equilibria. Without loss of generality we
consider a game with similar structure to the simple coordination game that is
depicted in Table 2. with two equilibria, the joint actions in the diagonal of the
payoff matrix, (U,L) and (D,R). We will present calculations for Player 1,but
the same results hold also for Player 2. We define λ as the necessary confidence
level that Player 1’s estimation of σt(L) should reach in order to choose action
U . Hence we Player 1 will choose D if:
σt(1) > λ⇔
exp(m−t [1])
exp(m−t [1]) + exp(m
−
t [2])
> λ⇔
m−t [1] > ln(
λ
1− λ ) +m
−
t [2]⇔
mt−1[1] > ln(
λ
1− λ ) +mt−1[2]
In order to prove Proposition 2, we need to show that when a player changes
his action his opponent will change his action at the same iteration with proba-
bility less than 1. In the case where at time t− 1 the joint action of the players
is U,R then Player 1 believes that his opponent will play L, while he observing
him playing R. Assume that Player 2’s beliefs about Player 1’s strategies has
reached the necessary confident level about Players 1’s strategy and at iteration
t he will change his action from R to L. Player 1 will also change his action at
the same time if
mt−1[2] > ln(
1− λ
λ
) +mt−1[1]
We want to show that players will not change actions simultaneously with prob-
ability 1. Hence it is enough to show that
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Prob(mt−1[1] > ln(
λ
1− λ ) +mt−1[2]) > 0 (8)
We can replace mt−1[1] and mt−1[2] with their equivalent from (7) and write:
m−t [1]− 2σ(1)
a(b− k)
4a2(b− k) + (r + ) > ln(
λ
1− λ ) +m
−
t [2] + 2σ(1)
a(b− k)
4a2(b− k) + (r + ) ⇔
− 4σ(1) a(b− k)
4a2(b− k) + (r + ) > ln(
λ
1− λ ) +m
−
t [2]−m−t [1]⇔
a(b− k)
4a2(b− k) + (r + ) <
ln( λ1−λ ) +m
−
t [2]−m−t [1]
−4σ(1)
Solving this with respect to  we have
 >
a(b− k)σ(1)
ln( λ1−λ ) +m
−
t [2]−m−t [1]
− a2(b− k)− r
Thus we can write (8) as:
Prob( >
a(b− k)σ(1)
ln( λ1−λ ) +m
−
t [2]−m−t [1]
− a2(b− k)− r) > 0 (9)
Since  is a Gaussian white noise (9) is always true.
We also consider the case where at time t− 1 the joint action of the players
is D,L then Player 1 believes that his opponent will play R, while he observing
him playing L. Assume that Player 2’s beliefs about Player 1’s strategies has
reached the necessary confident level and at t he will change his action from L
to R. Player 1 will also change his action at the same time if
mt−1[1] > ln(
λ
1− λ ) +mt−1[2]
We want to show that Players will not change actions simultaneously with prob-
ability 1. Hence it is enough to show that
Prob(mt−1[2] > ln(
1− λ
λ
) +mt−1[1]) > 0 (10)
We can rewrite (10) using the results we obtained for mt−1[1] and mt−1[2] in
(7) again as
Prob( >
a(b− k)σ(1)
ln( λ1−λ ) +m
−
t [2]−m−t [1]
− a2(b− k)− r) > 0 (11)
Since  is a Gaussian white noise (11) is always true.
If we define ξt the event that both players change their action at time t simul-
taneously, and assume that the two players have change their actions simultane-
ously at the following iterations t1, t2, . . . , tt, then the probability that they will
also change their action simultaneously at time tT+1, P (ξt1 , ξt2 , . . . , ξtT , ξtT+1)
is almost zero for large but finite T .
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